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1Abstract
Production subsidies for renewable energy have experienced inter-
mittent support from the federal government. One reason for less
than unied support arises from uncertainty over the environmental
impact of projects implemented because of such subsidies. Wind en-
ergy in particular has taken advantage of federal subsidies, but what
has been the environmental impact? Taking investment in wind capac-
ity as given, I am able to identify the short run substitution patterns
between wind power and conventional power for one geographic area
of the US electric grid. I exploit the exogenous nature of wind to
identify generator level substitution of wind generated electricity for
conventionally generated electricity. I then quantify the avoided emis-
sions and associated costs using generator level emissions information
and market clearing prices for pollution permits. The end result is the
value of avoided emissions due to government subsidies.
21 Introduction
Wind power has been rapidly growing in the United States. A major contrib-
utor to its growth are state and federal subsidies. These subsidies provide
a signicant stream of revenue for renewable energy operations, sometimes
providing half of the revenues for a wind farm. It is uncontroversial to state
that without subsidies wind farms would not be competitive with conven-
tional generators. The primary motivation for supporting renewable energy
is its lower environmental impact compared with conventional generators.
Despite these benets, federal renewable energy subsidies have been allowed
to expire several times. When subsidies have expired, investment in wind
farms has plummeted.
One reason for less than unied support for subsidies arises from un-
certainty over the environmental impact of projects implemented because
of such subsidies. When wind farms produce electricity, other generators,
which typically burn fossil fuels, reduce their production. To date, no stud-
ies have attempted to empirically measure the environmental contribution
of wind power due to these substitution patterns. The emissions oset by
wind power depend heavily on the type of generators that substitute with
wind power. Using detailed output data from generators on an electricity
grid in Texas, I exploit the exogeneity of wind power to identify generator
level substitution patterns between renewable wind energy and electricity
produced by conventional fossil fuel and nuclear generators. I then use the
substitution parameter for each generator to calculate avoided emissions us-
ing generator level emission rates from the EPA. Summing over generators
3Figure 1: Cumulative Installed Wind Capacity in the U.S.
in the system gives the total emissions avoided for each megawatt (MW) of
electricity produced by wind farms. A lower bound on the value of these
avoided emissions can be calculated by appealing to pollution markets for
SO2, CO2 and NOx. Under the assumption that wind farms are installed
due to subsidies, I can then compare the value of avoided emissions to the
cost of subsidies needed to produce wind power. I nd that the value of
avoided emissions is signicantly less than cost of subsidies needed to induce
investment in wind power.
42 Wind Power and Subsidies
A number of factors have contributed to the growth of wind power. First,
technology advancements in wind turbines have reduced the cost of wind
power by 80% over the past 30 years(Wiser & Bolinger 2006). These de-
velopments include advanced turbine design which can better use wind in a
greater range of speeds and also a real reduction in the cost of manufactur-
ing equipment. Second, there is growing demand for pollution free power by
rms wishing to promote a "green" image and by environmentally conscious
consumers wishing to oset their "carbon footprint". This allows wind gen-
erators to receive revenues for the environmental attributes of their power
by selling carbon osets in voluntary markets. However the most important
drive of wind energy has been State and Federal programs which subsidize
renewable energy. It is generally acknowledged that without government
subsidies most wind farms could not compete with conventional thermal
generators which use gas, coal or uranium as fuel(Wiser & Bolinger 2006).
There are two main types of subsidies which support wind energy: State
Renewable Portfolio Standards and Federal Production Tax Credits. Renew-
able Portfolio Standards (RPS) are state level regulations that require a cer-
tain proportion of power in the states to be derived from a renewable source.
Typically each electricity provider has to produce the required proportion
of renewable energy or must buy renewable energy credits from generators
that do produce renewable energy. The sale of renewable energy credits is
an implicit subsidy to renewable generators such as wind generators. The
5price of renewable credits varies greatly by state, ranging from $5 MWH to
$50 MWH, depending on the specic RPS , the supply of renewable energy
credits in the state, and the demand for renewable energy credits outside the
state(Wiser & Barbose 2008).
The Federal Production Tax Credit (PTC) is the single most important
subsidy for wind generators. First instituted in 1992, the PTC guarantees an
in
ation adjusted $20 /MWH tax credit for the rst ten years of production
of the facility. Given that the owner of the facility has a suciently large
tax liability, the tax credit is eectively a payment from the government
to the wind farm operator. Given that wholesale electricity typically sells
for between $30 and $50 per MWH, the PTC represents a 40-67% increase
in revenue for a wind farm operator. Also, there is no uncertainty in the
payment of the subsidy regardless of how market conditions evolve.
The importance of this subsidy to the industry can be seen by looking
at the patterns of wind capacity development. Since 1999 the subsidy has
been continued through short-term extensions. However, more often than
not, the subsidy has expired before it has been renewed by congress. It has
expired three times, at the end of 1999, 2001, and 2003 and was renewed the
following year at the end of 2000, 2002, 2004(AWEA 2008). The PTC was
also set to expire at the end of 2005, but for the rst time was renewed before
its expiration. According to industry advocates, six to eight months before
the expiration of the PTC nancing for capital dries up as lenders hesitate to
nance wind projects due to the uncertainty surrounding renewal of the sub-
sidy. Also since the subsidy guarantees 10 years of payments only to projects
completed before its expiration, developers rush to complete projects before
6the expiration resulting in smaller than planned installations or higher cost
wind farms(AWEA 2008). The Figure 2 shows annual installed wind capacity
nationwide between 1992 and 2007. Note the precipitous drop in installed
capacity in 2000, 2002, and 2004 after the expiration of the PTC in each
preceding year. After 2005 when the PTC was renewed before it expired,
there is an increase in installed capacity rather than a drop. While not con-
clusive, this does underline the importance of the PTC for the development
and operation of wind farms.
Figure 2: Annual Installations of Wind Capacity in the U.S.
Without State RPS and the Federal PTC, electricity production via wind
7farms would be economically unviable. It is not unreasonable to assume that
without the subsidies, investment in wind farms since 1997 would have been
negligible, as it in fact was over the decade prior. Under this assumption,
the Federal and State subsidies are responsible for the annual increases in
installed wind capacity over the past ten years.
3 Emissions and Wind Power Production
3.1 Emissions
Advocates of wind power and proponents of its subsidization tout its contri-
bution to the environment as a major motivator for subsidies. Wind turbines
produce none of the emissions typically associated with electricity produc-
tion such as SO2, NOx, and CO2. Every MWH of electricity produced by
wind power "osets" pollution that otherwise may have been emitted by a
conventional generator.
The type and quantity of pollution oset depends crucially on the spe-
cic generator whose production was oset. Emissions per MWH of elec-
tricity vary greatly across electricity generators due to fuel types, generator
eciency, and installed abatement technology. Thus if wind competes with
relatively ecient, clean generators, such as natural gas, the amount of oset
SO2, NOx, and CO2 would be much less than if wind power is substituted
for power produced by a relatively "dirty" generator, such as an older coal
plant. A high polluting coal plant emits 4 times CO2, 100 times SO2, 15
times the NOx as a newer generator burning natural gas(EPA 2006).
8If generator level production substitution can be identied then it is a
straightforward to calculate the oset emissions and the value of those emis-
sions. Multiplying the MWH of production reduced by the emissions rate
per MWH for SO2, NOx, and CO2 for a given unit yields the expected oset
emissions. The value of the oset emissions can be found by appealing to
emissions trading markets. Such markets exist for SO2, NOx and to some
extent CO2. The prices in these markets re
ect the marginal cost of reduc-
ing pollution. It is important to note that emissions regulated via cap and
trade, namely SO2 and NOx, are not actually reduced by wind power in the
aggregate. This is because oset emissions from displaced production free
up permits that can be banked for use in future periods or transferred to
a dierent geographic location. What is avoided is the cost of abating the
pollution that would have occurred if the wind generated electricity had not
been produced. To the extent that the marginal pollution abatement cost
curve is increasing, the permit prices represent a lower bound on the value
of oset permits since without wind power marginal abatement costs (and
thus permit prices) would be higher. For pollutants that are unregulated or
not regulated on a cap and trade basis, the oset emissions represent real
reductions in the total amount of pollutants emitted.
The generating substitutes for wind power depend crucially on the mix
of generation in the market, the relative geographic location of generators
on the transmission system, the daily wind patterns, and the institutions for
balancing real-time electricity supplied with demand. Although one might
have expectations about potential substitution patterns there is no way to
know a priori. The answer is essentially an empirical one. Since weather is
9outside of the control of any rm in the market and weather also determines
the amount of electricity produced by wind power, wind power will be an
exogenous variable in my model below which facilitates the identication of
displaced power.
3.2 Wind Production
Electricity is an unusual commodity in that it is not storable. The electricity
generated and consumed on an electric grid must be balanced on a second-
by-second basis. Most types of generators can adjust the output of their
generators at will, although time and cost associated with such adjustments
varies. Wind operators, on the other hand, have relatively little control
over output. On a calm day, no electricity can be produced. On a windy
day, operators basically face a choice of either fully utilizing their productive
capabilities or curtailing their production. Curtailing production amounts to
throwing electricity away since the marginal costs of production are almost
zero.
Wind power is characterized by high xed capital costs and nearly zero
marginal costs of production. A modern 1MW wind turbine costs roughly $1
million to install, but its fuel, wind, is free. Other operating and maintenance
costs are also very low compared with fossil fuel or nuclear plants(Wiser &
Barbose 2008). The high xed costs and zero marginal costs of production
create incentives for the operator to produce electricity to its fullest capacity
whenever possible. This is reinforced by the fact that a wind operator cannot
store its fuel, wind, or its output, electricity, for use at a later date. The
10Production Tax Credit, which is tied to the output of the wind farm, is an
additional incentive to produce as whenever possible1.
Due to its cost characteristics, whenever the wind is blowing, wind power
will be supplying its electricity to the grid. Other generators on the grid face
higher marginal costs of production, due to fuel costs, and have storable fuel.
Since they have full control over their output, they will reduce production to
balance supply and demand on the grid when wind power comes on line.
4 Literature Review
No existing studies have tried to identify the patterns of substitution between
wind generators and conventional generators econometrically, though some
planning and engineering studies have touched on the subject. One study
conducted by GE Energy for the New York State Energy Research and De-
velopment Authority, simulated the introduction of 3,300 MW wind capacity,
or 10% of total capacity, into the system. Using load and wind proles from
2000-2001, researchers projected load, wind power, and conventional gen-
eration for the year 2008 using specialized GE electrical system simulation
software. The impetus for this study was that the increased level wind power
1These incentives are re
ected in power contracts. Wind operators usually sell their
output through long term 20 year purchase power agreements (PPAs). Over the length of
the contract, the buyer agrees to purchase all power that can be generated by the wind
farm. Usually the buyer is specically interested in the environmental attributes of wind
power to fulll some "green" objective such as meeting state renewable portfolio standards.
These the environmental attributes of production are jointly purchased with the electricity
in most contracts. Wind operators, on the other hand, keep the federal PTC accruing from
electricity production. If the need arises to curtail production to maintain the reliability
of the grid or because the buyer requests a lower production, many PPAs still require that
the buyer pay the seller for the electricity that could have been produced, but was not.
In addition, the buyer may have to compensate the wind operator for forgone federal tax
credits due to the lower output (Windustry 2008)
11would adversely aect the reliability of the grid and impose excessive costs
on the transmission system. Although, the objective was to simulate the op-
eration of the grid with a large proportion of intermittent capacity, they also
were able to calculate the economic and environmental outcomes. In their
simulation they found that 65% of the energy wind power would displace
would come from natural gas generators, 15% from coal, 10% from oil, and
10% from electricity imports. This results in avoided emissions of 6,400 tons
of NOx and 12,000 tons of SO2. These statistics are sensitive to accuracy of
day-ahead predictions of wind power and to the way the market schedules
day-ahead generation(GE 2005).
5 Data
I use data provided by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT).
ERCOT oversees the Texas Interconnection (one of four interconnections
delivering electricity in the US) which serves the majority of the state of
Texas. I focus on this electric grid for two reasons. First, wind capacity
needs to represent a nontrivial share of generating capacity. By the end of
the sample in March of 2007, wind farms account for over 5% of installed
generating capacity on the gird. The share of wind generated electricity
ranges from 0% to 10%. The second reason to focus on the ERCOT is that
the grid is relatively isolated from other grids. The ERCOT grid has two
tie-ins to one neighboring grid over which less than 1% of daily generation is
exchanged. This means that wind generation in the ERCOT region directly
displaces other generators on the same grid whose output and characteristics
12I observe.
I observe unit level output for each unit which supplies electricity to the
ERCOT grid for each 15 min interval of each day from April 2005 to April
2007. A unit means a single generating turbine; a single plant usually has
multiple turbines. If a unit is connected to the grid for the entire sample
period, I observe 70,080 individual output decisions. In addition to output,
I have the characteristics of each unit including fuel type, location (county),
year online, capacity, and owner. There are approximately 550 units which
supply electricity to the grid which reside at 200 plants. I also observe daily

ows of electricity from the tie to the neighboring grid.
I do not observe the price units received for most of their power since
most energy transactions in the ERCOT market are the result of condential
bilateral contracts. I do however observe market clearing prices in the real-
time spot energy market. Contractual prices and balancing energy prices
should be similar on average or there would be gains from arbitrage.
I also have information on plant level emissions from 2004-2005 from
the EPA eGRID program. This data is collected from a variety of sources
including the Energy Information Administration's surveys including Form-
767, and the EPA's own Continuous Emission Monitoring data. Since the
emissions data is on the plant level, I aggregate up unit level output and
characteristics to the plant level also2.
2It would be possible to use unit level emission quantity with output data and fuel
consumption data would allow me to quantify the average emissions per KWH for each
generating unit without aggregating to the plant level. However, the EPA plant level
data is attractive since it has already undergone quality control procedures and corrects
emissions for combined heat/electricity generators. In addition, some units share the same
boiler or depend on waste heat from rst stage units making the relevant output decision
a plant level as opposed to a generator level decision.
136 Electricity Market
Before detailing the model, I rst explain the basic structure of power systems
and the institutional details of ERCOT. The institutional details unique to
specic electricity markets play a key role in the production decisions of rms.
6.1 Power System Basics
An electric system is composed of three main parts: generators, a transmis-
sion system, and a distribution system. Electricity produced by generators
is transmitted over high voltage lines to areas of demand where it is then
routed to individual consumers over the lower voltage distribution system.
Electricity is an unusual commodity in that it is not storable3. Electricity
production and consumption must be balanced on a second-by-second basis.
If more power is being consumed than is being produced then the reliability
of the grid is threatened. Sucient imbalances result in brownouts (dropping
electrical frequency) or blackouts (complete loss of electrical service). The
demand for electicity at any given time is called load. Meeting load reliably
is the central function of grid management.
In addition to the requirement that aggregate generation be equal to ag-
gregate load, transmission capabilities must be sucient to transmit power
from the location of generation to the location of load. Transmission conges-
tion occurs when a transmission line is operating at its maximum capacity.
3Chemical storage of electricity such as in lead-acid batteries are too costly to be used
to store any meaningful amount of electricity in a system. Technologies do exist to turn
electrical energy into potential mechanical energy which is storable such as compressed air
or pumped hydro electrical storage. These technologies do make minor contributions on
some grids,but no such technologies have been implemented on the electrical grid in my
study.
14Congestion requires the system to increase output from generators that can
transmit power over alternate routes to the load. Alleviating congestion may
require higher cost generators to run when lower cost generators are still not
operating at maximum capacity.
6.2 Institutions of ERCOT
Since 2002, the ERCOT region has been operating as a quasi-deregulated
market. Unlike many regulated and even deregulated markets, companies in
this market are vertically seperated. Generating, transmission/distribution,
and electricity retailing rms are separate entities. There are no vertically
integrated rms that control generating, transmitting, and retailing resources
as was previously the case before deregulation. This vertical separation was
required by the 1999 law that deregulated ERCOT to protect against market
power. The generation and retail markets have been competely deregulated,
while the transmission infrastructure is privately owned but regulated by
ERCOT to ensure the both incumbent and potential generators and retail-
ers have open access to energy and customers. Generators and electricity
retailers negotiate bilateral contracts for the delivery of wholesale electricity
or trade it on a real-time spot market called the Balancing Market. Retailers
then resell the electricity to end consumers.
6.2.1 Generation
Approximately, 95% of energy supplied on the grid is sold through bilateral
contracts with the remaining 5% being provided through the daily Balancing
15Market. Bilateral contracts result in planned energy transactions across the
transmission system. Each generator and retailer must schedule it planned
transactions with ERCOT a day ahead of production. ERCOT reviews all
submitted schedule to ensure that planned production meets reliability cri-
teria for the grid. Firms are instructed to change their schedules if the grid
will not support the proposed production and consumption patterns.
In addition to planned generation, rms also submit hourly bidding func-
tion for the delivery of electricity in the Balancing Market. A rms bidding
function delineates the change in production the generator is willing to make
for a given price for electricity in the Balancing Market. For example, as part
of its bidding function a generator may specify that it will increase produc-
tion by 2MW relative to its planned production if the price in the balancing
market is $50 MWH. Firms must specify both increments and decrements in
production as a function of the price of energy in the Balancing Market.
The Balancing Market is used by ERCOT to reconcile the dierence be-
tween planned generation/load and actual generation/load. For example, if
actual load is lower than predicted load then ERCOT will call on genera-
tors to decrease their production based on their bidding functions. Likewise,
generators will be called upon to increase production if some generator goes
oine unexpectedly 4. The Balancing Market is cleared every 15 mins by
intersecting the hourly bidding functions submitted by rms. The price re-
quired to produce the marginal unit of electricity is the market clearing price
4The Balancing Market is not only used to handle unexpected changes in load or gen-
eration. Under a relaxed balance energy schedule protocol, ERCOT also allows rms to
submit day-ahead schedules which leave them in long or short positions entering into the
market. Firms balance their positions through selling or buying electricity in the Balancing
Market.
16in that 15 minute interval. ERCOT then sends out generating instructions
to all winning bidders in that 15 min interval5. Generators on the grid dier
by fuel type, generating technology, and geographic location. For example,
coal and nuclear plants have low relative fuel costs and cannot adjust output
as quickly as other generating types. These generators tend to produce near
maximum capacity and do not participate as heavily in the Balancing mar-
ket. Simple cycle gas turbine generators on the other hand can adjust output
quickly, but are less ecient and have relatively high fuel costs. Proximity
to load can be an important for generators especially when key transmis-
sion lines are congested as generators located close to load centers face fewer
transmission constraints that generators in remote locations.
In 2007 there were approximately 80 dierent rms operating 180 power
plants which supply electricity to the Texas grid managed by ERCOT6 Com-
bined, these generators are capable of producing over 75,000 MW of electric-
ity at any one time. Generation technology includes coal, nuclear, natural
gas, water, and wind power plants. Table 1 shows the capacity by fuel type
and technology.
6.2.2 Transmission
Most of the time ERCOT operates as a single market and electricity 
ows
freely over the transmission grid. Since the transmission system is regulated,
transmission owners negotiate annual fees with ERCOT to cover the costs
5For a more detailed exposition of the functionings of the Balancing Market, I refer the
interested reader to (Puller & Hortacsu n.d.)
6There are additional generators which provide electricity on private networks, but
which do not provide electricity to the grid controlled by ERCOT.
17Table 1: Capacity Shares by Fuel Type
Total Capacity (MW) Share of Capacity
2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007
Natural Gas 47537 48372 49109 67.20% 66.20% 64.80%
Coal 15229 15729 15762 21.50% 21.50% 20.80%
Nuclear 4887 4887 4892 6.90% 6.70% 6.50%
Wind 1545 2509 4150 2.20% 3.40% 5.50%
Other 856 856 1106 1.20% 1.20% 1.50%
Water 512 512 501 0.70% 0.70% 0.70%
Petroleum Coke 142 143 143 0.20% 0.20% 0.20%
Diesel 40 40 38 0.10% 0.10% 0.00%
Landll Gas 40 53 59 0.10% 0.10% 0.10%
Total 70788 73101 75760 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
of maintaining and expanding the transmission grid and to receive a "fair"
rate of return on investments. ERCOT distributes these transmission costs
across generators according to each rm's share of total production. ERCOT
does not dierentiate between remote generators that make extensive use
of transmission lines and those which are located in close proximity to load
centers and thus place lower demands on the transmission network. However,
market rules do charge charge dierential prices for certain types of network
congestion.
At times of high demand, the transmission network can develop bottle-
necks that prevent electricity from 
owing from generators to load centers.
If left unaddressed, transmission lines can become severely overloaded lead-
ing to grid instability or failure. When transmission lines reach capacity,
ERCOT re-dispatches generating resources to ease constrained transmission
lines. In order to price the costs of re-dispatching generators, ERCOT has
identied key transmission routes as Commercially Signicant Constraints
(CSCs). When transmission constraints begin to bind on one of these routes,
18the ERCOT market splits into smaller zonal markets. There are currently
four of these congestion zones in ERCOT: North, South, West, and Houston.
As CSCs begin to bind between congestion zones, ERCOT separately clears
the balancing market in each zone to reduce congestion. For example, if the
transmission lines providing electricity from the West zone to the Houston
zone become overloaded, ERCOT will reduce production in the West zone
by lowering the balancing energy price while increasing production in the
Houston zone by raising the balancing energy price there. This reduces the

ow of electricity from between the two zones, but still meeting the demand
for electricity in each zone. Firms responsible for inter-zonal congestion are
charged for the cost of producing the higher cost power necessary to alleviate
congestion over the congested transmission lines.
Congestion can also occur within zones. For intra-zonal, or local, conges-
tion, ERCOT instructs specic generators, which normally would not pro-
duce at the prevailing balancing energy price, to start or increase production
in order to maintain the reliability of the grid. The costs of reducing in-
trazonal congestion are distributed across generators in a zone based upon
their share of production within the zone. Thus, larger generators bear a
larger proportion of local congestion costs even if they are not responsible
for congestion7.
7ERCOT is currently in the process of switching from a zonal pricing system for en-
ergy to a nodal pricing system. Under a nodal system each generator faces a potentially
dierent price for electricity which ostensibly incorporates all congestion costs created by
the generator.
196.2.3 Ancillary Services
In addition to the market for energy, there are smaller markets for ancillary
services which help maintain grid reliability. Outside of balancing energy, an-
cillary services include regulation, responsive reserves, non-spinning reserves,
and replacement reserves. Although important for grid reliability, they rep-
resent a very small share of total output. I consequently do not explicitly
incorporate them into my model.
6.2.4 Demand
As in most electricity markets, demand in ERCOT does not respond directly
or immediately to wholesale price signals. ERCOT does have a deregulated
retail electricity market that oers residential, commercial, and industrial
users a wide variety of energy plans and contracts. For example, residential
users can choose between plans with prices that change biannually or plans
with prices that change monthly. However, no users respond to price signals
in the balancing market. Additionally some large industrial users negotiate
lower energy prices by agreeing to have their supply of electricity temporarily
interrupted if generating reserves on the grid reach critical levels, but they
are not directly responsive to 
uctuations in the price of electricity in the
wholesale market8. Although emerging technologies may at some point allow
8Industrial users with interruptible loads are called Loads Acting As Resources (LaaRs).
In the event of an unexpected change in load, electricity delivery to the LaaR will be
interrupted to maintain the frequency on the grid. Approximately half of responsive
reserve services are supplied by LaaRs (MF7). It is important to note that as a general
rule LaaRs respond to events that threaten the reliability of the grid, not to price changes
in the wholesale market. However, it is possible that industrial users could respond to price
changes in the wholesale market through conditions in bilateral contracts with generators.
However, such contracts are condential so are not available to support this hypothesis.
20consumers to react to real-time energy prices, currently demand is irrespon-
sive to changes in wholesale energy market in the short run.
7 Model
7.1 Reduced Form Model
This paper aims to identify the substitution patterns between wind generated
power and output by conventional generators. Wind generated electricity
does not change a rm's output decision directly. Rather, wind generated
electricity, as a zero marginal cost producer, shifts the aggregate supply curve
down decreasing the price in the balancing market. In uncongested time
periods, this results in a lower uniform price for all generators across the grid.
In congested time periods, the eect on zonal prices depends on congestion
patterns and where wind power enters the grid. As the price for energy
decreases, conventional generators reduce their output. Given a price level,
two other factors can also aect a rm's optimal output decision: the price
of fuel and zonal or local transmission congestion.
One possible empirical model would rst estimate the eect of wind power
on price and then model each rm's response to the change in price controlling
for input prices and congestion. However, approach is overly complex for the
research question at hand as it requires estimating each rm's cost function.
Instead, I use a reduced form model to directly model the eect of wind
output on a conventional generator's output decision without modelling the
intermediate price mechanism by which it occurs. With appropriate control
21variables, the reduced form model allows the estimation of the parameter of
interest without modeling the possibly complex cost functions of each rm.
The reduced form model exploits the exogeneity and inherent randomness in
weather patterns to identify the generator level substitution coecient.
The reduced form model is constructed for each conventional generator i
as follows:
Yit = i0 + i1Windt + iZit + it (1)
where
t = 15 min interval of a day
Yit = output by generater i in time t
Windt = electricity generated by wind farms in time t
Zit = vector of control variables
The parameter of interest in the model is i1. If Windt is uncorrelated
with it then I can interpret i1 as the average reduction in output by gener-
ator i due to an 1 MWH increase in wind power.
Although wind power is exogenous, as output cannot be controlled by
any rm, it is not completely random. Wind power exhibits systematic
seasonal and diurnal 
uctuations. Wind production is high during the winter
and spring months and low during the summer and fall. On a daily level,
wind production is higher during the night than during the day. Because
these production patterns are consistently and negatively correlated with
peak demand for electricity, this would lead to a simple reduced form model
22overestimating the substitution between wind power and most generators
which increase output during peak periods of demand due to high energy
prices. Controlling for seasonal and diurnal variation will be necessary to
interpret a reduced form parameter as causal.
Growing wind capacity over my sample period necessitates further con-
trols. Installed wind capacity connected to the grid increased from 1430 MW
in April 2005 to 2794 MW in April 2007. This leads to a gradual increase in
expected level of wind production in each time period. This trend is likely
to be correlated with other trends in the data such as increasing demand
for electricity or a change in relative fuel prices. A generator whose fuel
price decreases relative to other generators over this period would introduce
a positive bias into the substitution coecient as an increase in average wind
output would be correlated with an increase in generator output. Also there
is a concern that since demand for electricity is primarily determined by
temperature variations, that aggregate demand will be correlated with wind
output if wind patterns are also correlated with temperature.
I control for trends and seasonality using a combination of xed eects and
exogenous variables. First to control for diurnal variation, I introduce xed
eects for every 15 in period within a day9. Second, to control for seasonality
in wind output I include a xed eect for every date in my sample over my
two year period. This also controls for correlations between wind capacity
and fuel prices or average daily demand which trend over the course of my
sample. Finally, I control for within day demand 
uctuations that may be
correlated with wind output by introducing hourly temperatures into my
9There are 24*4 = 96 intervals in a day.
23model. I calculate the average hourly temperature in each zone in ERCOT
by averaging the hourly temperature readings from two National Weather
Service weather stations from the urban centers in each zone10. I use hourly
temperature to calculate hourly cooling/heating degrees. The cooling or
heating degrees in an hour is the dierence between the outside temperature
and 65. It has been shown that 65 is the temperature when no heating or
cooling is need for an average building. I introduce heating/cooling degrees
and its square since it has been shown that electricity demand depends on
heating/cooling degrees in a non-linear way(Valor, Meneu & Caselles 2001).
The nal reduced form model is constructed for each conventional gener-





jd = interval j on date d
Yijd = output by generater i in interval j on date d
Windjd = electricity generated by wind farms
Degreesijd = cooling or heating degrees for hour containing interval j
on date d
10Part of the reason for averaging over two stations in the urban center is that sometimes
a station will not record a temperature reading for a given hour. Using two stations lls in
some of the missing temperature observations and also gives smoother temperature trend
that may better re
ect average demand. In the very few cases where both stations were
missing temperature observations I used a linear interpolation to ll in missing hours.
24Degrees2
ijd = cooling or heating degrees squared
Did = vector of date xed eects
Jij = vector of interval xed eects
8 Results
8.1 Expectations
Given the institutional framework and the underlying model, we might expect
certain types of generators to be better substitutes for wind power than
others. For example, natural gas generators can easily adjust their output
quickly and have high fuel costs. They tend to be the marginal producers
on most generating grids. Other generators like nuclear or coal have low
marginal costs of production and may have high adjustment costs of changing
levels of production quickly. Since natural gas plants have high marginal costs
and low adjustment costs, we would expect wind power to displace natural
gas generation, all else equal. From an environmental perspective this may
be less than ideal since gas generators are also less polluting than other
fossil fuel plants. However, there are several reasons to question whether
this simple intuition will hold. First, the ability to predict wind generation
a day-ahead will allow generators with high real-time adjustment costs of
production to plan their schedules around wind power. Second, the relative
geographic location of generators and load on the transmission grid aects
how electricity will 
ow on the grid. Once injected into the grid, system
operators have little ability to determine how electricity will 
ow through the
25transmission lines. Thus generators that are closer to each other on the grid
will tend to be better substitutes. Third, the time of day that wind power is
produced will in
uence the substitution patterns. Wind energy produced at
o peak times may substitute more for baseload coal and nuclear generators.
8.2 Market Level Results
I rst show market level results by fuel type to demonstrate that, at least
on the aggregate level, that substitution patterns are reasonable. I do not
use these results to calculate avoided emissions. For the market level results
output was aggregated in each 15 min period over all the grid by fuel type.
The regression specication is that specied in equation 2. As expected,
most of the substitution induced by wind power comes from gas generators
as shown in Table 2. The interpretation of the coecient is that one addition
MWH of wind generated electricity displaces 0.81 MWH of gas generated
electricity. However, a signicant proportion of substitution still comes from
coal plants despite the prevalence of gas capacity in the market. Nuclear
plants are impervious to changes in wind generated electricity. Other smaller
generator types also do not seem to react signicantly to wind power. It is
assuring that the sum of the coecients over fuel types do indeed sum to









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































278.3 Plant Level Results
For the plant level results, plant specic coecients were obtained by re-
gressing plant output on wind output and the control variables as specied
in equation 2. In all, 162 regressions, one for each plant, were performed.
Parsimonious results for all 162 regressions can be found the the appendix.
Table 3 shows the results for the top ten substituting plants. Of the top ten
substituting plants, four are coal plants. It is somewhat surprising the rst
and third ranked substituting plants are coal, but this may be due to the
fact that there are relatively few coal plants in ERCOT which tend to be
large. Gas plants on the other hand tend to be smaller and more numerous.
Summing up the coecients over all of the plant results in a market level
substitution coecient of -1.23. There is not a good explanation why the
coecients do not sum up to one. Also, a few plants have positive and sig-
nicant substitution coecients even though the coecients tend to be small.
Many of these plants are in the same zone (zone 5) as the majority of the
wind farms. This positive substitution may have to do with increased voltage









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29Given the plant level substitution coecients, we can now calculate the
emissions reductions for each plant by multiplying the emissions rate times
the substitution coecient. This is done for each plant on the grid. Sum-
ming over all plants in the system gives the total emissions reduction for an
additional MWH of wind power. This is shown in the last line of table 3.
Each MWH of windpower osets -2.28 lbs of SO2, -1.16 lbs of NOx , and
nearly one ton of CO2.
The value of these osets depends market value of these emissions. Table
4 gives low, medium, and high estimates of the value of reducing these pol-
lutants taken from permit markets11. The value of emissions oset by wind
power ranges from a mere $3 MWH to $31 MWH . Under the assumption
that no wind capacity would be installed without these state and federal
subsidies, we can compare the market price of oset emissions to the sub-
sidy received to induce the production of windpower. Wind power receives
federal PTC subsidies of $20 MWH. Renewable energy credits in Texas that
are sold under the state's Renewable Portfolio Standard are currently selling
for $10 MWH. In total Texas wind energy receives $30 MWH in subsidies.
This subsidy is greater than the price of emissions under both the low and
medium scenarios and approximately equal for the highest pollution prices.
In making this comparison, I assuming that wind energy does not change the
price of pollution permits. If wind power puts signicant downward pressure
11The pollution prices for SO2 and NOx where taken from historical transactions in EPA
pollution permit markets in the U.S.. CO2 is not a regulated pollutant in the U.S.. Low
and medium values for CO2 pollution were taken from transactions voluntary markets in
the U.S.. The voluntary carbon markets in the U.S. exhibit vastly dierent prices for CO2
osets in the same time period even though we would expect CO2 to be a homogeneous
bad. The high value CO2 is based on prices for CO2 permits in the European CO2 trading
market.
30on pollution permit prices then the estimates of the value of oset emissions
represent a lower bound. However, given that wind power contributes less
than 2% of to electricity production nationwide it seems unlikely that the
absence of wind power would signicantly increase pollution permit prices.
Table 4: Value of Emissions Oset by Wind Power
Value of Oset
SO2 NOx CO2 Emissions /MWH wind
Low $200 $2,000 $2 $3
Average $433 $5,000 $12 $14
High $700 $10,000 $27 $31
Prices for pollution are in $/ton
Under the assumption that no wind capacity would have been installed
without the current subsidies, it appears that the current prices for pollution
do not justify the subsidies wind power receives to operate protably. In
other words, subsidizing wind power as a form of pollution abatement is
more costly than other types of abatement.
It should be noted that the total value of oset emissions is primarily
driven by prices of CO2 pollution. Every MWH of wind power osets nearly
one ton of CO2. As price of reducing CO2 emissions approach the subsi-
dies received by wind generators for each MWH of production, wind power
becomes a cost eective method for avoiding emissions.
It should also be noted that the current prices for pollution permits are
largely a function of the cap specied by regulation. As such, the prices
may not re
ect the true social cost of pollutants. If the true social costs of
pollution were high enough, subsidies could be justied.
319 Conclusion
This paper measures the emissions oset by wind power production on one
grid in the United States. Using a reduced form model, I estimated generator
specic substitution coecients that re
ecting how each generator reduces
production to accommodate wind generated electricity. I nd that low cost,
high polluting coal plants account for approximately 20% of the substitution
while gas red plants account for the remaining 80%. Using generator spe-
cic emission rates which vary greatly across plants, I calculate the emissions
avoided because of electricity production by wind. It is important to note
that aggregate emissions do not change for cap-and-trade regulated pollu-
tants such as SO2 and NOx since permits that are freed up by emissions
oset due to wind power can be sold in another region of the U.S. or be held
for use at a future date. However, oset CO2 emissions do represent real
reductions in total emissions since these are unregulated. For all emissions I
can calculate the value of avoided emissions under the assumption that the
abatement costs are constant within the range of emissions oset by wind
power. Using several ranges of prices for pollution permits I nd wind sub-
sidies are not usually justied by the value of avoided abatement. However,
they may be justied if the true social cost of unregulated pollutants are high
enough.
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